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I. INTRODUCTION 
By many yardsticks, public choice is the single most successful 
transplant from the world of economics to legal scholarship. 1 As with 
other law-and-economics scholarship, critics have attacked its as-
sumptions, its methodology, and its conclusions. But nearly everyone 
concedes the power of at least some of the insights of public choice, 
and many of its terms, including "public choice" itself, have become 
common coinage in the legal literature, even among those who would 
never overtly rely on law-and-economics perspectives in their work. 
Although both Maxwell Stearns's collection of readings and 
commentary, Public Choice and Public Law, 2 and much of this Review 
focus principally on public choice in the legal literature, it is useful to 
begin with a brief description of the emergence of public choice 
outside of law. The antecedents of public choice date back over two 
centuries, 3 but the modern public choice literature is usually traced to 
pathbreaking work by Duncan Black in 1948 and Kenneth Arrow in 
1951. 4 Black's work, together with that of several other theorists, 5 
suggested that interest groups will exercise disproportionate influence 
over the political process. Arrow's work on collective decisionmaking 
underscored the difficulty of ensuring both fairness and rationality in 
legislative decisionmaking. 6 
1. As will become clear in my more detailed description of public choice in Part II, public 
choice actually came from the political science literature as well as from economics. Most public 
choice scholarship uses economic perspectives to explore the traditional concerns of political 
science. 
2. Maxwell L . Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary 
(Anderson, 1997) ("PCPL"). 
3. As Professor Stearns notes in his preface, interest group theory can be traced back to 
David Burne's theory of factions, and the French mathematician The Marquis de Condorcet 
wrestled in the late eighteenth century with some of the problems of collective decisionmaking 
described below. Id. at xxi. 
4. Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. PoL Econ. 23 (1948) 
(explaining how groups make decisions when members are not in complete accord); Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (John Wiley & Sons, 1951). See notes 20-23 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Arrow's Theorem. 
5. Other foundational contributions include Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (Harper & Row, 1957) (arguing that rational voters have little incentive to inform 
themselves); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (U. of Michigan, 
1962) (exploring the rules governing legislative decisionmaking based on the assumption that 
decisionmakers act in their own self interest); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 
(Harvard U., 1971) (exploring the dynamics of collective action and concluding that small groups 
are more likely to be effective than large ones). 
6. The two aspects of public choice scholarship that I have just described correspond to 
the two principal branches of public choice, interest group theory and social choice, each of 
which will be discussed in some detail in Part II. Although I have emphasized the influence of 
Black's article on the development of interest group theory in the text, it also influenced Arrow's 
work and is seen as seminal both to interest group theory and to social choice. Black also dealt 
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Public choice emerged at a time when, although recogmzmg 
the influence of interest groups, many leading political theorists as-
sumed that pluralism-often defined as vigorous competition among a 
variety of interests-would lead to legislation that generally furthered 
the public good. 7 If nothing else , public choice cast cold water on this 
perspective and offered a much more sober view of the political 
process. 
Legal scholars first began to explore these insights in earnest 
in the mid-1970s. Much of the early legal literature debated the im-
plications of public choice for judicial review. Could, or should, courts 
attempt to correct for the dysfunctions of the legislative process, and 
if so, how?8 Subsequent commentators pointed out that judicial deci-
sionmaking and market processes may also be subject to interest 
group pressures and the concerns raised by social choice. These schol-
ars argued that a more complete analysis must realistically consider 
the nature of each of the relevant institutions. 
Public Choice and Public Law is the fourth book, all of which 
have appeared in the last six years, to explore the implications of 
public choice for legal issues at a general leveP The first, Law and 
Public Choice by Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, 10 can be seen as 
both a general introduction to public choice and an argument that its 
insights support traditional theories of statutory interpretation. 
William Eskridge's Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 11 also focuses on 
more directly with social choice concerns in subsequent work. See generally Duncan Black, The 
Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge U., 1958). For useful overviews and histories of 
public choice and its two branches, see Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in John Eatwell, Murray 
Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 3 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 1040 
(Stockton Press, 1987) (discussing interest group theory and social choice, with emphasis on 
interest group theory); Charles K. Rowley, Introduction, in Charles K. Rowley, ed., 1 Public 
Choice Theory: Homo Economicus in the Political Market Place ix (Edward Elgar, 1993) 
(focusing on interest group theory); Charles K. Rowley, Introduction, in Charles K. Rowley, ed., 
1 Social Choice Theory: The Aggregation of Preferences xi-xvi (Ashgate, 1993) (discussing social 
choice) . 
7. Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Cornell U. , 1952); David B. Truman, The 
Governmental Process (Knopf, 2d. ed. 1971). 
8. I discuss these developments in detail in Part III. 
9 . Other books that are motivated in significant part by the insights of public choice, but 
which focus on particular areas of the law include, Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners 
(Princeton U., 1994) (developing a political theory of separation of ownership and control in cor-
porate governance); William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 
(Harvard U., 1995) (presenting an interest group analysis of takings). 
10. Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction (U. of Chicago, 1991). 
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Harvard U., 1994). 
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statutory interpretation, and uses public choice to argue that judges 
should be solicitous of underrepresented groups. 
vVhile the first two books reflect what might be described as 
the first wave of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship, the third, 
Imperfect Alternatives by Neil Komesar, can be seen as inaugurating a 
new trendY Komesar emphasizes the importance of comparative 
institutional analysis, and criticizes the "single institutional" focus of 
most existing law-and-economics analysis. 
Professor Stearns's Public Choice and Public Law differs most 
obviously from the three books I have just mentioned in that it is a 
collection of readings, rather than a through-written book. Yet it 
would be misleading to characterize Stearns's effort as simply a sur-
vey of the first two decades of public-choice-influenced legal scholar-
ship . It is that, to be sure, but Public Choice and Public Law also 
offers extensive commentary that both reflects and extends the dis-
tinctive, and important, perspective that Stearns has brought to his 
own work in this area. 13 
I describe Public Choice and Public Law in some detail in Part 
IV of this Review. I begin, however, with the basic (and for many, 
quite perplexing) question: What exactly is "public choice?" 14 After 
describing the interest group and social choice branches of the public 
choice literature, and explaining the relevance of collective action 
theory, game theory, and positive political theory, I focus in Part III 
on public-choice-influenced legal scholarship. In addition to 
elaborating on the brief account given above, Part III considers how 
legal scholars can, and in my view should, make use of public choice 
insights in their current and future work. I emphasize two 
approaches that strike me as particularly promising, which I refer to 
as "institution reinforcing" scholarship and "framing" strategies. In 
Part IV, I return to Stearns's book and show how it both provides a 
valuable resource for existing public choice scholarship and advances 
the next wave of public-choice-influenced legal analysis. 
12. Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy (U. of Chicago, 1994). 
13. A caveat at the outset. I have known Max Stearns for some time, and have read much 
of his work (including parts of Public Choice and Public Law) in draft, so in some respects I am 
not an entirely objective reviewer. I have no doubt that I would be equally enthusiastic about 
his work if I did not know him, however, and I do not hesitate to point out my occasional 
quibbles with Public Choice and Public Law in the analysis that follows. 
14. Stearns gives a useful overview of the development of public choice and introduces 
some of the terminology I discuss in Part II. PCPL at xvii-xxvi (cited in note 2) . My aim in Part 
II is to provide a more detailed exposition of the terms and the relationships among them. 
1997] PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 651 
II. WHAT Is PUBLIC CHOICE? 
A. The Two Branches of Public Choice 
When a new perspective comes into vogue, it is perhaps inevit-
able that commentators will employ it in confusingly different, and 
even inconsistent, ways. This certainly has been true of public choice. 
The term "public choice" is bandied about so loosely that it can seem 
extraordinarily unclear just what this analysis is. Is public choice the 
same thing as "social choice," for instance, or are they somehow differ-
ent? How does game theory relate to this analysis, and how do con-
cerns about "collective choice" or "positive political theory" fit in? 
The discussion that follows offers brief answers to some of 
these questions. Most importantly, I will define what most 
commentators mean by "public choice." I then will consider the 
relationship between public choice and other perspectives that often 
appear in public-choice-influenced scholarship. 
At a general level, the distinctive characteristic of public choice 
is its "use of economic tools to deal with the traditional problems of 
political science." 15 Perhaps the most basic of these tools is the as-
sumption of individual rationality. In contrast to much traditional 
political analysis, public choice assumes that all of the relevant play-
ers tend to act in their own self-interest, and explores the implications 
of self-interest for the legislative and other institutional decisionmak-
ing processes. 
The public choice literature thus can, and in my view should, 
be seen as including any analysis that incorporates or explicitly 
challenges the self-interestedness premise in addressing institutional 
decisionmaking processes. The literature that fits within this defini-
tion consists of two principal branches. The first can be described as 
interest group analysis, and the second is social choice. 
The central insight of interest group analysis is that concen-
trated interest groups often benefit at the expense of more widely 
scattered groups, even if the diffuse group has much more at stake 
overall.I6 Although this insight is now so familiar that it seems obvi-
15. Tullock, Public Choice, in Eatwell, Millgate, and Newman, eds., 3 The New Palgrave at 
1040 (cited in note 6). 
16. For cites to foundational works in interest group theory, see notes 4-5. Subsequent 
explorations of the relative effectiveness of concentrated groups, as compared to more diffuse 
ones, include George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation , 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 
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ous to many, it was far from obvious when it emerged in the public 
choice literature. Whereas many theorists assumed that interest 
group competition tends to produce public-regarding legislation, 
public choice suggested that self-interested behavior by each of the 
relevant actors could lead to strikingly different outcomes. 
The reasoning is as follows. For a self-interested voter, taking 
the time to inform herself and to vote intelligently is an unattractive 
proposition, since the likelihood that her vote will affect the outcome 
of an election is minuscule. Although voters as a group would benefit 
if each took the time to vote intelligently, ordinary voters simply do 
not have an incentive to do so. By contrast, because the members of a 
concentrated interest group have more at stake with respect to the 
issues that concern them, they tend both to inform themselves and to 
participate actively in the political processY 
The interest group branch of public choice suggests that the 
distinction between ordinary voters and concentrated interest groups 
is not lost on legislators. Self-interested legislators are likely to focus 
principally on getting reelected, since legislators who fail to do so 
quickly become ex-legislators. Because interest groups are better 
informed than ordinary voters, and serve as an important source of 
political funding, legislators have a tremendous incentive to be re-
sponsive to interest group perspectives. 18 
3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J . L. & Econ. 211 
(1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 
98 Q. J. Econ. 371 (1983) (arguing that competition between interest groups increases spending 
on the public good). James Q. Wilson and Michael Hayes developed systematic accounts of 
Congress based on these distinctions. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Basic Books, 
1973); Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislatures: A Theory of Political Markets (Rutgers U., 
1981). 
17. Those familiar with the literature will recognize this aspect of interest group analysis 
as based on collective action theory. I describe collective action theory and its relationship with 
public choice below with a particular emphasis on the contributions of Mancur Olson. See notes 
33-36. Although I treat collective action theory separately for expositional clarity, I should note 
that it is very much a part of the interest group literature. 
One of the enduring puzzles of the literature is why, given the lack of incentive to vote, a 
relatively large number of citizens do in fact vote . Commentators critical of public choice point 
to this puzzle as evidence of the limitations of its rationality and self-interestedness 
assumptions. Compare generally Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of 
Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987) (describing the literature on voting patterns and 
criticizing public choice theorists' explanations), with Michael E. DeBow and Dwight R. Lee, 
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 
Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1988) (defending public choice analysis). 
18. See, for example, R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (Yale U. , 
1990). For a critique of this reasoning, arguing that legislators are motivated by factors such as 
ideology and advancement within Congress, rather than reelection alone, see Kay Lehman 
Schlozman a nd John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (Harper & Row, 
1986). 
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Like the interest group literature itself, I have focused princi-
pally on the advantages interest groups have in the legislative proc-
ess. But this analysis, and in particular its self-interest assumption, 
also has generated important insights into related areas such as the 
incentives of agency bureaucrats and, as we shall see in Part III, the 
nature of the judicial process. 19 
The second branch of public choice is social choice. At the 
heart of much of the recent social choice literature is Kenneth Arrow's 
famous impossibility theorem. Arrow's Theorem demonstrates that it 
is impossible to design a system that will always both aggregate the 
preferences of a group of decisionmakers in a rational fashion, and 
satisfy a short list of fairness requirements. 20 If there is a particular 
kind of inconsistency, referred to as multipeakedness, across the 
preferences of a group of decisionmakers (each of whose individual 
preferences is wholly consistent), the voting procedure will cycle 
endlessly among the possible outcomes unless one or more of the 
fairness requirements is relaxed. 21 
To see this, assume that Voter 1 prefers outcome A to B, and B 
to C; Voter 2's preferences are B, C, A; and Voter 3's ranking is C, A, 
19. On agency bureaucra ts, see William A. Niskanen, Jr. , Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government 36-42 (Aldine-Atherton, 1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek to maximize their 
agency's budget). On judges, see Richard A. Posner, What do Judges Maximize? (The Same 
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 28-30 (1993) (analogizing judicial 
decision making to adhering to the rules of a game). Public choice theorists have had far more 
difficulty modeling bureaucrats' and judges' behavior, as compared to legislators and private 
economic actors, due to the absence of a compelling theory as to what bureaucrats and judges 
maximize. Public choice insights have also been applied to the market process. See, for 
example, Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 98-122 (cited in note 12). 
20. See generally Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (cited in note 4). For 
importa nt explorations of Arrow's Theorem and of the overall insights of social choice, see 
William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 Q. J . Econ. 507, 508-12 (1960) 
(developing list of fairness requirements from Arrow's analysis); William H. Riker, Liberalism 
Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social 
Choice (W.H. Freeman, 1982) (social choice analysis of the effects of voting rules and difficulties 
in aggregating preferences); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge U., 1989) (leading 
text and survey of interest group theory and social choice). 
21. Briefly, the fairness terms are "unlimited range," which requires that no individual 
preference ordering be held off-limits; "independence of irrelevant alternatives," which requires 
that each decisionmaker adhere to her actual ordinal ranking of the alternatives (rather than 
voting strategically); "nondictatorship," which precludes any one individual's preferences from 
trumping those of others; "universality," which requires that no possible preference ordering be 
precluded; and "unanimity," or the "Pareto postulate," which requires that the process honor 
any preference held by all of the decisionmakers. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm 
in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming February 1997) (manuscript at 22 n.45, 
on file with the Author) (citing Vickrey, 7 4 Q. J. Econ . a t 507 (cited in note 20)). See also 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L. J. 1219, 1247-52 
(1994) (describing the criteria of Arrow's Theorem in detail) . 
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B. In a pa1rw1se vote between A and B, outcome A would prevail 
(with Voter 1 and Voter 3 voting for A). Outcome C would prevail 
over A in a similar vote (on the strength of votes from Voter 2 and 
Voter 3). But, in a third vote between C and B, B would prevail, 
despite the fact that it loses to outcome A, which C defeats. On closer 
consideration, it quickly becomes clear that none of the three options 
can defe a t the other two in pairwise voting, and that any voting 
outcome is thus unstable . This cycling occurs because the preferences 
are "multipeaked." Preferences are multipeaked only if the 
decisionmakers not only disagree about which choice is bes t (or 
second best or worst), but also disagree about the relationship among 
the choices. If their preferences were arrayed from smallest to 
largest, or conservative to liberal, the problem would disappear. 
Cycling would not occur even if the decisionmakers each chose a 
different first choice. 22 
Much of the r ecent literature has focused on the trade-off 
posed by the possibility of m ultipeaked preferences. A voting 
institution that adheres to Arrow's fairness criteria will cycle 
endlessly in these circumstances, but relaxing one or more of the 
requirements introduces the possibility of path dependence and path 
manipulation. To give a familiar example, Congress's prohibition 
against reconsidering an outcome that has been defeated in an earlier 
vote counteracts the risk of cycling. In the illustration above, for 
instance, outcome C would prevail under this rule, since outcome B 
could not be reintroduced after it lost to outcome A. Yet the cost of 
eliminating cycling is that the order of voting determines the 
outcome-the result is path dependent. The rule , therefore, vests 
significant power in anyone who has the ability to manipulate the 
order of the voting. za 
The discussion thus far suggests a rough rule of thumb for 
distinguishing between the interest group and social choice branches 
of public choice. Many of the important contributions of interest 
group theory stem from the insight that not all voters are equal due to 
22. To see this ; assume in the illustration above that A is a conservative position, B is 
moderate, and C liberal. If this were true, voters l and 2, as a conservative and a moderate, 
might keep the preference orderings described earlier (Voter l = A, B, C; Voter 2 = B, C, A). 
Voter 3, as a liberal, would probably change her ordering to C, B, A, since her second choice, 
after the liberal outcome, would no doubt be the moderate one. If we make this single shift in 
the voters' preferences, the cycling problem disappears. Option B now defeats both A and C in 
pairwise votes (voters 2 and 3 prefer B over A, and voters 1 and 2 prefer B over C). 
23. For an excellent discussion of path dependence and age nda control, and the effect that 
factors such as congressional committee structures have, see Riker, Liberalism Against 
Populism at 137-95 (cited in no te 20). 
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the organizational advantages enjoye d by members of a concentrated 
group. Social choice , on the other h a nd, explores the dynamics of 
voting under conditions where voters are a t least initially assumed to 
have an equal voice. In fact, the liter a ture on cycling shows that vot-
ing pathologies can emerge even if each voter particip a tes fully. 2 ~ 
Despite this distinction, it is important to emphasize that the 
line between interest group theory and social choice is a rough one , 
and it quickly blurs in both directions. 25 The two branches of public 
choice analysis share a common his tory, and commentators often 
employ both in their efforts to understand a particular voting institu-
tion. Consider the extensive literature on logrolling. From a social 
choice perspective, logrolling m ay act a s a solution to cycling concerns, 
since legislators avoid cycling by trading votes on matters they are 
relatively indifferent about for votes on matters about which they care 
deeply. Interest group theory raises questions as to whether the 
"solution" is an attractive one, however, given that logrolling could en-
hance interest groups' ability to obtain private benefits from the legis-
lative process. 26 
An additional source of confusion is that the term public choice 
is used in two ways. I have characterized public choice as a general 
term comprising both interest group theory and social choice, and 
many commentators do likewiseY But other commentators use 
public choice more narrowly, as a synonym for interest group 
analysis. 28 When a commentator indicates that she will tell a "public 
24. In addition to cycling, arguably the mos t prominent other socia l choice insight is the 
Media n Voter Theorem. The Median Voter Theorem suggests tha t the ca ndidates in two party 
(or two issue) voting contests will edge toward the middle in an effort to capture a majority of 
votes. In consequence, the position of the median voter will prove pivotal. This is precisely the 
effect that our changes to the cycling illustration produced in note 22. The theorem has given 
rise to a vast literature exploring the insight and the conditions under which it does or does not 
hold. For an overview, see Mueller, Public Choice II at 65-7 4, 180-82 (cited in note 20). 
25. Other commentators have suggested that interest group theory is descriptive rather 
than normative in nature, wherea s social choice is inherently normative-focusing on how 
voting procedures should function . See, for example, Rowley, Introduction, in Rowley, 1 Public 
Choice Theory at ix (cited in note 6). Although there is an initial plausibility to this distinction, 
it quickly breaks down. Interest group theory is increasingly normative in nature, as Buchanan 
and Tullock's work on constitutions demonstrates. For an early example, see Buchanan and 
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (cited in note 5). Further, much social choice work is 
descriptive. See, for example, Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219 (cited in note 21). 
26. For a useful discussion of logrolling, and its potential for either perverse or benign 
effects, see Mueller, Public Choice II a t 82-94 (cited in note 20). 
27. Mueller's excellent book on public choice theory is an exa mple . Id. at 1-6 (describing 
the coverage of the book, which includes both socia l choice a nd interest group theory). 
28. Although Professor Stearns appears to define public choice in the preface as 
comprising both socia l choice and interest group theory, see , for exa mple , PCPL a t xix (cited in 
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choice story" about a given issue, it is often this narrower definition 
that she has in mind. 
B. Related Concepts 
Having explored in some detail what we mean when we talk 
about public choice, we still must consider how several related modes 
of analysis interact with public choice. Two of the most important are 
game theory and collective action theory. I will focus on these, then 
conclude with a brief description of the emerging literature employing 
"positive political theory." 
Game theory refers to the economic analysis of strategic inter-
action-the choices that individuals make when they recognize the 
outcome depends in part on the decisions made by others. 29 The 
"game" in game theory, then, is the interaction between two or more 
independent decisionmakers, each of whom attempts to account for 
the actions of the others. Game theoretic analysis formalizes this 
interaction by precisely specifying the players involved, the informa-
tion available to each at any given point, and the different outcomes 
that would result from each set of "moves" the players might make. 30 
The most familiar game theory insight is the prisoners' di-
lemma. In the prisoners dilemma, two prisoners who have 
committed a crime and cannot communicate with one another must 
each decide whether to confess. Although the prisoners would be 
better off if neither confessed than if both confessed, the best outcome 
results from confessing when the other prisoner refuses to do so. As a 
result, both have an incentive to confess and the game often results in 
the least desireable outcome-two confessions.31 
note 2), he treats public choice and social choice as distinct perspectives-thus equating public 
choice with interest group theory-elsewhere in the book. See, for example, id. at 556 
(distinguishing "teachings of public choice" and "teachings of social choice"). 
29. Stephen W. Salant and Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime 
Time?, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1839, 1846-47 (1996). 
30. For those interested in exploring game theory further, two excellent book reviews and 
the books they discuss are a good starting point. See id. (reviewing Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. 
Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard U. , 1994)); Ian Ayres, 
Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1291 (1990) (reviewing first edition of Eric 
Rasmusen, Games and Information (Basil Blackwell, 1989)). See also Robert J. Aumann, Game 
Theory, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 2 The New Palgraue: A 
Dictionary of Economics 460 (Stockton Press, 1987) (providing a history of game theory). 
Another useful introduction is David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modeling 
(Clarendon Press, 1990). 
31. The literature on the prisoners' dilemma is legion. For an overview, see Anatol 
Rapaport, Prisoner's Dilemna, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate, and Peter Newman, eds., 3 
The New Palgraue: A Dictionary of Economics 973 (Stockton Press, 1987). Professor Stearns 
also provides a useful discussion in PCPL at 119 (cited in note 2). 
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The irony of the prisoners' dilemma-that the actions of indi-
viduals behaving in their own best interests can produce outcomes 
that are undesirable for all of them-has led to valuable insights in a 
wide range of areas. One of the most important is in public choice. 
Recall the interest group insight that diffuse groups tend to fare 
poorly in the legislative process. The principal reason for this is that, 
while the members of a diffuse group might be better off if each 
participated in an informed fashion, each member has little incentive 
to do so. In other words, diffuse groups tend to face a debilitating 
prisoners' dilemma problem. Interest group analysis thus depends in 
important respects on a concept taken straight from game theory. 
In contrast, the central insight in social choice theory, Arrow's 
Theorem, does not involve game theory in its initial formulation. The 
principled voting requirement precludes voters from considering the 
preferences and likely actions of other voters, thus ruling game theo-
retic interactions out of bounds. 32 Yet once we move beyond the initial 
formulation-as we must, given that no institution can both satisfy 
the fairness requirements and guarantee rational outcomes-strategic 
interaction quickly reenters the picture. The agenda control and 
strategic voting concerns that have animated much of the social choice 
literature are classic examples of strategic interaction, and are par-
ticularly amenable to game theoretic analysis. 
As should be clear by now, game theory is a useful tool in any 
context where we wish to consider the nature of strategic interaction 
between two or more decisionmakers. Because strategic interaction is 
integral to much of public choice, it is not surprising that we find so 
much game theoretic analysis in the public choice literature. The 
second term we need to fit into our picture is collective action-not to 
be confused with the misleadingly similar term "collective choice."33 
As with game theory, we can see the relevance of collective action 
theory most easily by focusing on the interest group branch of public 
choice. Recall that the prisoners' dilemma from game theory is a 
32. This criterion , which is usually characterized as the "independence of irrelevant alter· 
natives," requires that the voters consider only their preferences with respect to a given vote , 
without taking other possible votes into account. See note 21 for a list of other relevant criteria. 
33. "Collective choice" is a term some commentators use to characterize the literature I 
refer to as social choice. See, for example, Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: 
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6·9 
(1991) (providing that collective choice theory assumes that each individual has an equal vote). 
Collective choice can thus be seen as a synonym for social choice. I have used social choice 
because most commentators do likewise , and because it seems at least marginally less 
confusing. 
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useful tool for explaining the barriers that often prevent large groups 
from acting in concert. 34 The collective action literature starts from 
precisely the same insight, that free riding prevents many groups 
from acting collectively. 35 
Collective action theorists take the obstacles to collective 
action as their starting point, and ask how it is that some groups do 
succeed in acting collectively. These theorists have identified two 
factors that seem particularly important to successful group action. 
First, smaller groups have a significant advantage as compared to 
large ones, both because members may have a larger individual stake 
in successful action and because members can more easily police one 
another against free riding. Second, groups that have access to 
"selective incentives"-that is, mechanisms for rewarding or 
punishing members for contributing or failing to contribute to the 
collective action-are more likely to prove effective. 36 
A moment's reflection will make clear that collective action 
analysis is central to the distinction between concentrated and diffuse 
groups in interest group analysis, and to any effort to predict which 
groups will prove successful in legislative and other decisionmaking 
processes. The collective action literature is less immediately 
relevant to social choice, since social choice tends to focus on the 
voting decisions made by isolated individuals within a decisionmaking 
process. Yet as soon as we move beyond stylized assumptions about 
the voting process, and integrate interest group questions such as 
why some voters vote and others don't into our social choice analysis, 
collective action concerns come back into play. 
In attempting to relate game theory and collective action to 
public choice, it is tempting to suggest that the former apply broadly 
to aspects of legislative, market, and judicial behavior, whereas public 
34. See note 31 and accompanying text. 
35. Collective action theory thus depends in its very conception on a game theoretic 
insight. 
36. See Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in John Eatwell, Murray Millgate , and Peter 
Newman, eds., 1 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 474, 474-75 (Stockton Press, 
1987). Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action (cited in note 5), was the pioneering work, 
and Olson has been the guiding light of the discipline. The other most prominent theorist is 
Russell Hardin. See Russell Hardin , Collective Action (Johns Hopkins U ., 1982). Hardin 
emphasizes that it is the concentration of members in a group, rather than their number that 
determines the group's ability to organize. Id. a t 40-41. He also contends that successful 
collective action often results from political entrepreneurship, or as a by-product of other 
activity by a group. ld . at 35-37 (discussing politica l entrepreneurship); id. at 31-35 (discussing 
by-product). 
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choice is uniquely concerned with the legislative process. 37 Yet this 
would be a mistake. Although public choice has focused primarily on 
legislative behavior, it increasingly has been employed to explore 
courts and markets as well, as I will consider in much more detail in 
Part III. 
Before we turn to the applications of public choice, however, 
we should briefly consider one final term: positive political theory. 
Positive political theory uses game theory to explore relationships 
among decisionmaking institutions such as Congress, administrative 
agencies, and the courts. It differs from public choice in that it 
focuses on the strategic interactions among political decisionmaking 
institutions, and on institutional structures, rather than on the 
individuals who comprise the institutions. Positive political theory 
does take account of the problems of multi-individual decisionmaking 
that preoccupy collective action theory and the two branches of public 
choice. But it does so indirectly. Positive political theory incorporates 
these considerations into its characterization of an institution. It 
then takes intra-institution concerns as a given, in a sense, in order to 
emphasizes strategic interactions between and among institutions. 
In short, this new perspective makes direct use of game 
theoretic analysis; though it has a different focus than either branch 
of public choice, it is closely connected to both. 38 
III. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE LEGAL LITERATURE 
As is usually the case when legal academics draw on nonlegal 
insights, public choice did not enter legal discourse until well after it 
had captured the attention of economists and political scientists. It 
was not until the mid-1970s that legal scholars first explored the 
implications of public choice, even though many of the seminal in-
sights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in 
place for over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal 
37. Notice that this distinction is to a certain extent implied by the frequent description of 
public choice-the description with which I began the analysis of this Part-as the use of eco-
nomic approaches to explore the concerns of political science. 
38. Important contributions to this emerging literature include William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J . 331 (1991) 
(describing interaction between Congress, courts, and the President); John A. Ferejohn and 
Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 263 
(1992) (analyzing interaction between the Supreme Court, the Congress enacting legislation, 
and the current Congress in the context of Court decisions based on statutes). 
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literature by storm. In this Part, I 'vill briefly describe the diffusion 
of public choice into the legal literature. I then will speculate as to 
the future of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship. 
A. Law and Public Choice: The Firs t Wave 
The first wave of public choice inquiry in the legal literature 
can be seen as a classic illustration of legal academics sticking to their 
area of comparative advantage. V!hereas much of the extant eco-
nomic and political science public choice literature focused on the 
legislative process, legal academics asked what the implications of 
public choice are for the legal system. 
The first wave took as its starting point the social choice and 
interest group insights that the legislative process cannot guaranty 
outcomes that are both fair and rational, and that concentrated inter-
est groups will exert disproportionate influence over the process. The 
obvious issue raised by the prospect of legislative dysfunction was the 
proper role for judges to play. How should public choice affect our 
view of the nature of statutory interpretation and, more generally, of 
judicial review? 
Three commentators prompted a vigorous debate on this ques-
tion by offering distinct visions of statutory interpretation in a post-
public choice world. The starkest proposal was that of Judge Frank 
Easterbrook. Judge Easterbrook suggested that courts not only 
should recognize the role of interest groups in the political process, 
but that they also should enforce any interest group bargains 
reflected in the legislative product. 39 Rather than trying to "correct" 
the process in some way, judges should interpret statutes in 
accordance with the realities of how they were enacted. Judge 
Richard Posner initially staked out a position similar to Judge 
Easterbrook's,40 though he subsequently shifted his focus to a 
perspective less obviously tied to the insights of public choice.41 
39. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14-18 (1984). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' 
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 552 (1983) (arguing that courts should refuse to apply statutes 
to issues not addressed by the terms of the statute). 
40. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution , 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 284-85 (1982) (arguing that courts should defer to interest 
group influence rather than find a constitutional right where constitutionality is unclear). See 
also Rubin, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 52, 62 n.218 (cited in note 33) (contrasting Posner's current, 
"imaginative reconstruction" approach with his earlier public-choice-influenced work). 
41. Judge Posner's late r view suggests that judges should view their role as extrapolating 
from legislators' incomplete communications. Posner's current position is thus a variation of 
traditional theories of statutory in terpreta tion t hat call for judges to fill in s tatutory gaps . 
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P rofessor Jonathan Macey responded to Judge E ast erbrook 
and to Judge Posner's initial position by proposing a more 
independent, and more aggressive, role for courts. While agreeing 
that courts should enforce clear interest group bargains, Professor 
M acey contended that courts should refuse to enforce "implicit" 
bargains-that is, interest group deals that legislators disguise by 
defending the provision in question in public-regarding terms. 
Professor Macey contended that by refusing to enforce implicit bar-
gains, courts could raise the costs to interest groups of obtaining 
private interest legislation, and in doing so moderate the in fluence of 
interest groups. 42 
In addition to their political conservatism, each of the 
commentators shared a view that the pessimistic insights of public 
choice do, in fact, accurately describe the legislative process. Not 
surprisingly, this perspective prompted a backlash of sorts. Most 
prominently, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey acknowledged that the 
public choice account of legislation is accurate in important respects, 
but contended that many of the dire conclusions of public choice are 
overstated.43 In their view, judges should simply police the political 
process for obvious defects, and should otherwise let the political 
process run its course. 
Although generally sympathetic to public choice, William 
Eskridge shared some of Professors Farber and Frickey's concerns as 
to its limitations. Professor Eskridge's model of statutory 
interpretation called for judges to show solicitude for 
underrepresented minorities when they exercise judicial review. 44 
Cass Sunstein has used public choice insights in somewhat similar 
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts 286-93 (Harvard U., 1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817 (1983) 
(arguing that imaginative reconstruction based on incomplete legislative intent is the proper 
judicial methodology rather than application of traditional canons); Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986-87) (arguing that proper judicial interpr~tation involves judicial 
action rather than inaction when judges are faced with an incomplete or ambiguous statute). 
As noted in the text, Judge Posner's current view is only loosely tied to public choice. I 
include it both because Judge Posner describes it as a continuation of his interest group 
analysis, see Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 800 (cited in this note), and because Posner has 
played a prominent role throughout the debate. 
42. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 250-56 (1986). 
43. Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 61-62, 153 (cited in note 10). 
44. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 294 (cited in note 11). 
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fashion, and has argued that courts should interpret statutes a nd the 
Constitution so as to curb interest group excesses. 45 
Despite the sophistication of the debate, nearly all of the pro-
posals suffered from a single, obvious weakness : in striking contrast 
to their sober portrayal of legislators, the proposals tended to assume 
that judges are somehow above the fray and can be wholly objective in 
interpreting the statutes that come before them . Yet there is no rea-
son to believe that the judicial process is immune from interest group 
activity and the other kinds of distortions that characterize legisla-
tion . Once we subject judges to the sa me public choice scrutiny previ-
ously reserved for legislators, it becomes much more difficult to 
blithely assume that statutory interpretation can counteract the prob-
lems of legislative decisionmaking. 46 
Interestingly, the literature on the evolution of the common 
law has proceeded on a somewhat analogous track, with overly opti-
mistic early accounts giving way to more realistic assessments of the 
judicial process. Starting in the early 1970s, Judge Posner contended 
that common law rules tend to become efficient over time, due in large 
part to judges' unarticulated preference for efficient, rather than 
inefficient, rulesY Other commentators argued for the efficiency of 
the common law on other grounds. 48 Yet the differential interests of 
45. See , for example , Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
Harv. L. Rev. 405, 478-79 (1989) (suggesting courts should and sometimes do aggressively 
construe statutes where concentra ted interest groups might otherwise undermine their 
implementation); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 
1689, 1689-93 (1984). 
For other prominent articles critical of the assumptions and use of public choice, see Richard 
H. Fildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, 
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121 (1990) (criticizing the use of 
social choice); Rubin, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 33) (criticizing public choice's 
rationa lity assumption as too narrow an account of legislators' behavior and arguing for a 
"comprehensive rationality" approach). 
46. For one of the best, and most sustained, arguments along these lines, see generally, 
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrus ive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale 
L. J. 31 (1991). 
47. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 320-28 (Little , Brown, 1973). Pos ner 
has resta ted this claim in subsequent editions of his treatise. See, for example, Richard A. 
Posner , Economic Analysis of Law 520-21 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992) (stating that judges' 
"aloof disinterest" in the outcome of cases replicates the invisible hand of the market). See also 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard U., 
1987) (attempting to show efficiency of tort law empirically). 
48. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51, 53-57 
(1977) (arguing that litigation by groups with a long-term interest in precedent can lead to 
efficiency); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. 
Legal Stud. 65, 66-75 (1977) (arguing that more frequent litigation of inefficient rules prods 
common law toward efficiency). For an excellent review of the literature , see Robert D. Cooter 
and Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. 
Lit. 1067, 1091-97 (1989). In contrast to Posner's view, which focuses on judges, much of the 
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different kinds of litigants, and other biases in the cases that go to 
trial, suggest that any tendency toward common law efficiency 1s 
likely to be, at most, a weak one. 49 
The first wave of public choice scholarship has thus compli-
cated, rather than simply clarified, our understanding of the roles of 
legislators and judges. The extent to which interest group influence 
and the distortions identified by social choice undermine the legisla-
tive process remains unclear. In addition, the ability of the judiciary 
to counteract these influences on legislative decisions is open to ques-
tion. The obvious next step is to engage in a more nuanced compari-
son of decisionmaking institutions. As we shall see, this raises in-
triguing questions as to the future of public-choice-influenced legal 
scholarship. 
B. Catching the Next Waue 
It seems safe to say, as I have just noted, that the next wave of 
public choice scholarship will reflect an increasing interest in com-
parative institutional analysis. Rather than simply identifying the 
flaws of a particular institution, public-choice-influenced legal 
scholars will consider the comparative attributes of each of the 
relevant institutions.so 
Evidence of just such a trend already exists. A recent book by 
Neil Komesar contends that there is an urgent need for comparative 
other literature, including Rubin and Priest, has argued that the litigation process tends toward 
efficiency even if judges are not themselves efficiency minded. For a critique, see Gillia n K. 
Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Geo. L. J. 583, 584-85, 594-98 (1992) 
(distinguishing between "invisible hand" approaches and those based on judges' motivations, 
and attempting to refute the latter). 
49. See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant , 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1693-94 
(1996) (arguing that litigants typically have little regard for the social costs imposed by 
inefficient rules). 
This is not to say that public choice influences affect courts to precisely the same extent as 
they do legislatures. Federal judges do not face the same reelection pressures as legislators, for 
instance, and thus may be somewhat less susceptible to interest group pressure. But they a re 
not immune. See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative 
Lawmaking System, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1147-53 (1991) (stating that specialized courts are 
more susceptible to capture than generalized courts). 
50. For an interesting article detecting an increasing interes t in institutional analysis in 
areas ranging from critical theory to law and economics, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal 
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1393, 1403-11 (1996). Although I share Rubin's view as to the importance of nuanced 
institutional analysis, I am less optimistic that this trend will unify legal discourse to any 
meaningful extent. 
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institutional analysis in order to counteract the distortions of single 
institution analysis in law-and-economics- scholarship. 51 Professor 
Komesar's transaction costs model emphasizes the interests that 
affected individuals or groups have, their costs of participation, and 
how these factors change as we shift our focus among markets, the 
legislative process, and the judicial system.52 
With the enhanced sensitivity to comparative institutional 
analysis, we can expect to see increasingly sophisticated applications 
of public choice insights in the legal literature. Ironically, however, 
existing comparative analysis has tended to fall into precisely the 
same trap that its advocates criticize: the assumption that there 
exists an objective, unbiased context where institutional distortions 
can be corrected. Thus, comparative analysis often begins with a 
nuanced assessment of the respective institutions, then shifts to a 
prescriptive mode whose proposals depend on implementation by an 
unbiased decisionmaker. Most frequently, the analysis awards this 
status to courts, whose limitations are ignored when it comes time to 
act on the insights of the comparative analysis. 53 
It is easy enough to see the reason for this oversight. Because 
legal scholarship is at its heart prescriptive, comparative analysts feel 
a natural urge to progress from descriptive analysis to proposals for 
change. 54 In doing so, however, they face a strong temptation to forget 
the real world limitations of the institutions with which they are 
concerned. 
The obvious antidote to this problem is to pursue the analysis 
all the way down-that is, to resist the temptation to address correc-
tives to a hypothetically unbiased decisionmaker. Yet this poses an 
intriguing dilemma for future public choice scholarship. Given the 
51. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (cited in note 12). 
52. One of Komesar's principal illustrations is tort reform. Whereas corporate tortfeasors 
are well represented both in the judicial and legislative contexts, tort victims have effective 
representation only in the courts. This is because the possible returns to potential tort victims 
are too low, and their costs too high, to justify organizing to lobby legislatures. ld. at 171-77. 
Only after a tort victim is injured, and considers filing suit, are her stakes high enough to justify 
action. Id. In view of these facts, Komesar suggests (although only tentatively) that the 
decision whether to limit tort damages may be more appropriately made by courts than 
legislatures. Id. at 194-95. 
53. Thomas Merrill has criticized Komesar's analysis in these terms. Thomas W. Merrill, 
Institutional Choice and Political Faith, J. L. & Soc. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 61-65, on 
file with the Author) (reviewing Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (cited in note 12)). 
Although courts, like legislatures, are imperfect, they face different pressures and may have 
a comparative advantage in some respects. Merrill suggests that there are limits to how much 
advantage an interest group may obtain by outspending its opponent in litigation. Id. at 29-30. 
54. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1835, 1847-53 (1988). 
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typically prescriptive nature of legal scholarship , what role can the 
next wave of public choice literature, with its enhanced sensitivity to 
institutional limitations, play? What can so relentlessly descriptive 
an analysis aspire to? 
In the following sections, I will suggest two ways in which the 
next wave of public choice scholarship can perform an important 
prescriptive function . 
1. The Institution-Reinforcing Role of Public Choice 
The first role that institutionally nuanced public choice schol-
arship can play might be described as "institution reinforcing." What 
I mean by this is that descriptive public choice analysis may offer a 
novel explanation of an existing institution, an explanation that rein-
forces rather than undermines the normative validity of the institu-
tion.55 
One of the best r ecent examples comes from Professor Maxwell 
Stearns's own work on standing doctrine. Constitutional law scholars 
have for years criticized standing doctrine as, among other things, a 
mechanism the Supreme Court uses to avoid deciding difficult issues 
on the merits. As the Court's invocation of standing has increased, so 
have the complaints that its use disguises the real reasons for the 
Court's decisions. 56 
Drawing on the insights of the social choice branch of public 
choice, Professor Stearns has suggested a different explanation of 
standing. Professor Stearns's account begins with the observation 
that the Court faces the same problems, such as the risk of cycling or 
of path dependence, as other collegial decisionmaking bodies. 57 
Moreover, because the Court must resolve the cases it hears, it does 
55. Notice that successful institution-reinforcing schola rship may therefore succeed in 
generating novel, non-intuitive insights about the effects of a given regime. For a discussion of 
this in other law-and-economics contexts, see Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-
realist Explanation, 24 L. & Soc. Rev. 1217, 1227 (1990) (reviewing book by Steven Shavell and 
noting this quality in the book). 
56. See, for example, L<luise Harmon, Fragments on the Deathwatch, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 
61 n.120 (1992) (discussing the Court's avoidance of constitutional questions). 
57. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 
83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309, 1335-50 (1995). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social 
Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995) (providing empirical support for 
Stea rns's social choice theory applied to Supreme Court decisions). Judge Easterbrook was the 
first legal commentator to view the decisionmaking of collegial courts through the lens of socia l 
choice. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court , 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 81 3-32 
(1982) . 
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not have the option of evading these perversities by simply doing 
nothing, as legislators can in the event their preferences cycle. 
Professor Stearns argues that for much of the Court's history, this has 
not been a problem, since the justices have tended to hold single-
peaked preferences-usually, preferences arrayed along a single 
spectrum from left to right. But the Court's membership and the 
issues coming before it have increased in heterogeneity, which has 
magnified the likelihood that they will have multipeaked 
preferences. 58 
The emergence of multipeaked preferences dramatically 
increases the risk of path manipulation by ideological litigants. To 
the extent judges (or circuits) are more likely than in the past to have 
irreconcilable views on a given issue, strategic factors such as choice 
of forum play an unusually, and inappropriately, important role both 
in initial outcomes and in the development of precedent. 59 In 
Professor Stearns's view, the Supreme Court's increasing use of 
standing to dismiss cases is best seen not as an unprincipled refusal 
to grapple with the merits, but as a means of counteracting this sort 
of path manipulation.60 By limiting standing to litigants who are 
most directly affected by the harm in question, the Court reduces the 
likelihood that cases will be brought solely to influence the decision 
path.61 Social choice thus may provide an important justification of an 
otherwise puzzling trend in Supreme Court decisionmaking. 
In illustrating how public choice can be used to explain an 
existing institution, I have not yet suggested the prescriptive role that 
such a project can serve. Yet it is easy to see how the act of descrip-
tion is itself prescriptive. By proposing a new way of conceptualizing 
an existing institution, public choice scholars are attempting both to 
58. See Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 349-85 (cited in note 57) (finding the Warren court 
to have singlepeaked preferences, even on divisive issues such as whether to incorporate the Bill 
of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have 
m ultipeaked preferences). The persuasiveness of Professor Stearns's analysis obviously 
depends in important part on his contention that the Justices' preferences increasingly have 
become multipeaked. 
59. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing cycling, path dependence, and path 
manipulation) 
60. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1318 (cited in note 57); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 347-
48 (cited in note 57). 
61. This is not to suggest that standing can eliminate path dependence in judicial 
decisionmaking. The argument, instead, is that it reduces litigants' ability to manipulate the 
path, thus enhancing the perceived fairness of the litigation process. 
Notice, too, that the analysis requires that the Supreme Court justices hold similar views 
about the role of standing-or at least act as if they did. If the justices' views on standing were 
as divergent as their views on an underlying issue, standing would prove less effective in 
counteracting path manipulation. 
\ 
\ 
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describe, and, in some respects, to transform the institution in ques-
tion. Thus, if one or more justices agreed with Professor Stearns's 
suggestion that standing is crucially concerned with minimizing path 
manipulation, they might begin to speak explicitly in these terms in 
their standing cases. To the extent this occurred, the social choice 
explanation would both reinforce and alter existing standing doctrine. 
There is, of course, a long tradition of law-and-economics schol-
arship that aspires to just this role .62 Because institution-reinforcing 
scholarship seeks to explain what already is, it often does not produce 
readily testable hypotheses. Yet the approach need not preclude 
empirical examination, as some of the best law-and-economics efforts 
to date have shown.63 One suspects that important work in public 
choice scholarship will continue in this tradition. 
2. Using Public Choice to Frame Reform 
The illustration we have just considered suggests that public 
choice can be used to explain, and thus to reinforce, an existing insti-
tution. Public choice analysis also could play an important role in 
overtly seeking change. In particular, the analysis gives scholars a 
tool not simply for describing an institution, but also for more effec-
tively framing a proposal for reform. 64 
As with the previous illustration, recent scholarship demon-
strates how public choice insights can be used to frame reform. In 
their article on double taxation of corporate income, Jennifer Arlen 
and Deborah Weiss offer an interest group explanation for the persis-
62. See Johnston, 24 L. & Soc. Rev. at 1224-27 (cited in note 55) (characterizing Landes 
and Posner's arguments as to the efficiency of tort law as transformative in intent). My own 
view is that most law-and-economics scholars divide into two categories: those who tend to 
assume the existing regime is roughly appropriate, and who are thus are likely to engage in 
institution-reinforcing scholarship; and those who are suspicious of existing law and are inclined 
to call for sweeping change. 
63. Landes and Posner's work is seen by some as an example, but it has been sharply 
criticized by others. For another example , see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured 
Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986) (developing relational theory to explain existing 
secured transactions rules, and comparing it to existing evidence on lending patterns). 
64. Existing work is much more likely to take the opposite approach, and to employ public 
choice (usually interest group theory) analysis to explain why a proposal the author views as 
optimal has not be adopted. Although this approach can yield valuable insights, it often has a 
post hoc quality that suggests the work was primarily intended to preempt criticism that the 
proposal in question is implausible or ill-founded. 
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tence of a double tax despite a near consensus in favor of reform. 65 
Professors Arlen and \Neiss contend that, although corporate manag-
ers would seem to be natural allies of tax reform, two factors suggest 
that managers actually are the most obvious obstacles. First, manag-
ers may be lukewarm about reform because they would rather lobby 
for tax benefits, such as investment tax credits, that benefit them 
more directly. 66 Second, some managers may actively oppose reform, 
since the "earnings trap" created by double taxation gives them 
greater discretion to invest a firm's earnings than they would 
otherwise have. 67 
Even more than their explanation of double taxation, what is 
noteworthy about the analysis of Professors Arlen and Weiss for our 
purposes is that they conclude by using their interest group insights 
to suggest directions for effective reform. Given the implausibility of 
reforming double taxation in the face of resistance by corporate man-
agers, Professors Arlen and Weiss argue that proponents should 
propose a phased-in plan, rather than one-shot reform, in order to 
maximize the benefit to the kinds of new investment that managers 
tend to prefer. 68 In addition, proponents should consider neutralizing 
managers' resistance by focusing on proposals that preserve at least 
some of the retained earnings trap-thus, adopting a second best 
approach that could succeed rather than a purer reform that would 
almost certainly fail. 69 
This use of public choice as a means of framing a reform pro-
posal addresses an important criticism of the use of public choice 
insights in the legal literature. In response to the first wave of public 
choice scholarship, one prominent commentator argued that scholars' 
descriptive analyses of existing institutions invariably are colored by 
their own normative perspective on the issue and institution in ques-
65. See Jennifer Arlen and Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 
105 Yale L. J. 325, 363-65 (1995) (concluding that double taxation results from the resistance to 
change by a small group of managers). 
66. Id. at 340-42. The difference is that elimination of the double tax would principally 
benefit existing capital rather than the kinds of future investment with which management is 
most concerned. 
67. Id. at 348-49 (noting also that some managers prefer the earnings trap, though the 
number is likely to be small). 
68. Professors Arlen and Weiss also note tha t proposals enhancing shareholder voice could 
further reform efforts. Id . at 363-65. 
69. Id. at 365-66. As a final consideration, Arlen and Weiss warn against proposals that 
would permit specified kinds of firms to avoid double taxation, since such proposals would 
undermine the benefited firms' incentive to press for more widespread reform. Id. at 367. Thus, 
the recent success in obtaining pass-through tax treatment for new entity forms such as limited 
liability companies co uld undermine efforts to re form the double tax. 
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tion. ;o In view of this, he argued that scholars should drop the public 
choice analysis and simply debate their normative position directly, 
rather than doing so indirectly and covertly through an ostensibly 
neutral application of public choice.; 1 
A scholar who uses public choice for fr a ming purposes can, if 
she wishes, clear ly distinguish her norm ative inclinations from her 
descriptive institutional analysis. The scholar could begin by stating 
and defending her normative view and then turn to the insights of 
public choice in order to frame a proposal that seems most likely to 
succeed, given the realities of the institution in question. Such a 
strategy h as the important virtue of making the commentator's nor-
mative commitment explicit, without requiring her to sacrifice the 
insights offered by a nuanced public choice analysis. 
The framing strategy has a second valuable attribute. Public 
choice is often criticized as excessively m alleable-that is, as lending 
itself to any conclusion a commentator wishes to reach . An important 
virtue of the framing strategy is that it can be used to develop 
testable hypotheses about the nature of a decisionmaking 
institution.72 To return to the corporate double taxation example, 73 
the analysis of Professors Arlen and Weiss suggests that proposals 
providing for phased-in implementation, and those that preserve some 
of the retained earnings trap, will prove more successful than 
proposals that do not do either of these things. Their prediction, like 
the predictions of other scholars who propose a framing strategy, can 
be tested by tracking the historical and/or the subsequent pattern of 
actual legislative, judicial, or market activity. 
3. Conclusion 
In describing ways that scholars can make use of the increas-
ing sensitivity to comparative institutional analysis, I do not mean to 
suggest that all public-choice-influenced legal scholarship will adopt 
these kinds of approaches. Public choice will no doubt continue to be 
70. Elhauge , 101 Yale L. J. at 49-59 (cited in note 46). See also David A Skeel, Jr. , 
Reuiew of William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings : Law, Economics, a nd Politics, 88 Pub. Choice 
433, 434-35 (1996) (suggesting similar reservations about Fischel's unstated assumptions in 
Fischel's fascin ating interest group assessment of takings law). 
71. Elha uge, 101 Yale L. J . a t 62-63 (cited in note 46). 
72. For a s imilar observation about transaction cost economics, see J ohnston , 24 L. & Soc. 
Rev. a t 1243 (cited in note 55) (stating that transaction cost economics has the virtue of generat· 
ing testable mathematical hypotheses). 
73. See notes 65-69 a nd accompanying text. 
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used as a source of occasional insights into analyses whose focus is 
elsewhere, much as it is now. 
Nevertheless, to the extent public choice scholarship does 
progress in a discerna ble direction beyond the first wave, there almost 
certainly will be an increasing recognition of the importance of com-
parative institutional analysis. Both institution-reinforcing analysis 
and framing strategies are ways for scholars to employ a nuanced 
institutional analysis while at the same time engaging in legal aca-
demics' traditional task of prescribing solutions to perceived problems 
in the law. 
IV. REVIEWING PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 
Having discussed the terminology and the significance of public 
choice for the legal literature, we now have a useful context for con-
sidering Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary more 
explicitly. 
Writing a reader is, in many respects, a low ceiling project. 74 
In assembling and editing a group of law review articles and related 
materials, the editor/author's principal contribution often is simply to 
save other teachers and scholars the time a nd expense of performing 
this function themselves. A reader that does this successfully may 
prove financially rewarding to the editor/author, but it does not pro-
vide any particular contribution to the literature. 
Even from the subtitle, it quickly becomes apparent that 
Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary has 
appreciably larger ambitions. As "Readings and Commentary" 
suggests, the book consists of extended discussions of the articles 
included and many of the issues the articles raise. This ongoing 
commentary is as central to the book as the articles themselves, and 
gives Public Choice and Public Law a distinctive, "through-written" 
feel that is quite remarkable for a book of this kind. To show this, let 
me begin by briefly describing the book itself, and by focusing on 
several choices Professor Stearns has made in deciding which articles 
to include. I will then conclude by discussing how the commentary 
ties the articles together in such a way as to make Public Choice and 
7 4. Fortunately for those who prepare them, they a lso can be a low cost project. At its 
simplest , a reader may be little more than a by-product of a scholar's own class prepara tion . 
Once the scholar has selected and ed ited the materials, preparing the reade r for publication 
may enta il little extra effort. 
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Public Law an important new contribution to the public choice 
literature in its own right. 
The book is divided into three long chapters. The first chapter 
begins with a subchapter devoted to the debate about public choice's 
assumptions that decisionmakers are rational and act in their own 
self-interest. The chapter then concludes with a subchapter labelled 
"Economic Reasoning: An Introduction to Modelling." Although 
Professor Stearns's commentary does discuss modelling in some 
detail, the more obvious theme of the articles is that each focuses on 
or critiques the inter est group branch of public choice theory. Thus, 
the subchapter includes articles taking differing views of the 
implications of interest group theory for the line item veto75 and 
legislative delegation, 76 together with Professor Elhauge's critique of 
the literature using interest group theory to justify particular 
perspectives on judicial review. 77 
Professor Stearns devotes the second chapter to the social 
choice branch of public choice. The chapter uses articles by Professors 
Stearns and Saul Levmore to introduce central social choice concerns, 
such as cycling. 78 The remaining articles in the chapter consider 
bicameralism, legislative intent, and judicial decisionmaking from a 
social choice perspective. The first two chapters thus give a complete 
introduction to public-choice-influenced legal literature, including 
public choice's rationality assumptions and its two major branches . 
Together, these chapters cover roughly one-half of the book. 
The remainder of the book consists of a single chapter labelled 
"Applications of Covered Concepts." In this final chapter, Professor 
Stearns shifts from a focus on the basic contours of public choice 
theory, to articles that have used some aspect of public choice analysis 
to shed light on a particular issue. In brief, the chapter includes 
articles using interest group theory, social choice theory, or both, to 
75. Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 385 (1992), in Stearns, PCPL at 77 (cited in note 2); Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice 
Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1988), in Stearns, PCPL at 101 (cited in note 
2). 
76. Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982), in Stearns, PCPL at 134 (cited in note 2); Jerry Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 81 
(1985), in Stearns, PCPL at 180 (cited in note 2). 
77. Elhauge, 101 Yale L. J. at 31 (cited in note 46), in Stearns, PCPL at 204 (cited in note 
2) . 
78. Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 
75 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1989), in Stearns, PCPL at 258 (cited in note 2); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 
1219 (cited in note 21), in Stearns, PCPL a t 295 (cited in note 2). 
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explore stare decisis, statutory interpretation, the efficiency of the 
common law, and standing. The chapter then concludes with 
summaries of articles on discrimination. 79 
It quickly becomes apparent that Professor Stearns has made 
two very important choices in selecting the materials he includes, 
both of which affect the tone of the book and the kinds of courses for 
which it is most useful. First, Professor Stearns has limited his focus 
to the legal literature that employs public choice analysis, omitting 
almost entirely the contributions to public choice of economists and 
political scientists. 80 The problem posed by this choice is that, because 
all of public choice's foundational works were nonlegal, Professor 
Stearns must acquaint his readers with this work indirectly, by 
including law review articles that themselves discuss the seminal 
nonlegal contributions. Fortunately, the omission of nonlegal works 
proves to be a strength rather than a weakness of the book. Not only 
are law review articles likely to be much more effective pedagogically 
in law school classes, but Professor Stearns also has edited the 
articles in such a way as to include rich discussions of the important 
nonlegal public choice literature.81 
In addition to focusing on the legal literature, Professor 
Stearns also has selected only public law analyses. 82 Consequently, 
Public Choice and Public Law omits entirely the burgeoning public 
choice literature on private law concerns such as tax policy and corpo-
rate takeover doctrine. 83 This is not to say that the book is of interest 
79. Lynn Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into 
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, SO Geo. L. J. 1787 (1989), in Stearns, PCPL at 
901 (cited in note 2); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003 (1995), in Stearns, PCPL at 
909 (cited in note 2). 
80. The articles that come closest to being exceptions appeared in economics-oriented legal 
journals. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992), in Stearns, PCPL at 393 (cited in note 2) (written 
by a political scientist); Rubin, 6 J. Legal Stud. at 51 (cited in note 48), in Stearns, PCPL at 727 
(cited in note 2) (economist). 
81. This is particularly apparent in Professor Stearns's decisions as to which footnotes to 
include and which to omit. Although many footnotes are omitted, Professor Stearns has tended 
to retain those that reference pivotal non-legal contributions to, or describe, the development of 
the public choice literature. In the first article, for instance, the footnotes he includes cite to 
much of the important political science literature. See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, 
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987), in Stearns, PCPL at 11 n.56, 12 
nn .59-62, 67 , 13 nn .69-70, 73, 75 (cited in note 2). See also Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 
Cornell L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 76), in Stearns, PCPL at 144 n.76, 153 n.134, 154 nn .136-39, 
141 (cited in note 2) (providing references to foundational non-legal work in social choice). 
82. The inclusion of "Public Law" in the title of the book makes this selection clear. 
83. Saul Levmore alludes to this approach in his characteristically insightful foreward to 
the book. Saul Levmore, Foreword to Maxwell L. Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law: 
Readings and Commentary xv (Anderson, 1997). As a result, Public Choice and Public Law is in 
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only to public law scholars, however. The entire structure of public 
choice analysis can be seen as "public" in nature, since much of the 
literature focuses on the general dynamics of the legislative and judi-
cial processes. It is only a t the application stage that the focus of 
private law scholars diverges from that of their public law colleagues. 
A private law scholar who wished to teach from Public Choice and 
Public Law might therefore assign all of t he first two chapters, while 
substituting private law applications in the final chapter. 8~ 
Anyone who is familiar with Professor Stearns's own path-
breaking work on social choice a nd constitutional process will have no 
difficulty understanding his reasons for structuring the book as he 
has. In addition to providing a representative selection of articles, the 
book also can be seen as reflecting the intellectual concerns of its 
author. Most obviously, we see this in Professor Stearns's inclusion of 
three of his own articles. 85 
some respects a natural substitute for a legislation course, as Levmore also points out. Id. But 
it can easily be adapted to other courses, as I describe in the text below. 
84. Some of my own picks might include, in the tax area, Arlen and Weiss, 105 Yale L. J. 
325 (cited in note 65) (discussing interes t group theory of double taxation); Richard L. 
Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Dnrability of Tax 
Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987) (interest group theory of tax legislation); Daniel Shaviro, 
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by 
Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. l (1990) (considering interest group, populist, 
and psychological factors in tax legislation). In corporate law, I would include, among others, 
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111 (1987) 
(antitakeover statutes); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press, 
1993) (charter competition in corporate law, antitakeover statutes); Roe, Strong Managers, 
Weak Owners (cited in note 9) (political explanation of separation of ownership and control); 
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P . Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987) (charter competition). For bankruptcy, Eric A. 
Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Author). See also Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political 
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) (interest group theory of uniform 
laws process in commercial law). I am, of course, also partial to my own work in bankruptcy, 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. 
L. Rev. 465, 495-595 (1993) (applying interest group theory to bankruptcy legislation), and 
corporate law, Skeel, 83 Va. L. Rev. (cited in note 21) (forthcoming February 1997) (considering 
the effect of the Delaware Supreme Court's norm of unanimous decision making in social choice 
and interest group terms). See also David A. Skeel Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate 
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 512-45 (1994) (discussing charter 
competition in corporate law and arguing that a similar process would lead to superior 
bankruptcy laws if states regulated corporate bankruptcy). 
85. Stearns, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 385 (cited in note 75), in Stearns, PCPL at 77 
(cited in note 2); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219 (cited in note 21), in Stearns, PCPL at 295 (cited 
in note 2); Stearns, 83 Calif. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note 57), in Stearns, PCPL at 787 (cited in 
note 2). One suspects that subsequent editions also will include his recent contribution to a 
colloquium debating the merits of issue-by-issue and outcome voting by courts. Maxwell L. 
Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor 
674 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:647 
More importantly, and more interestingly, the connections 
between the book and Professor Stearns's own ongoing project are 
evident throughout the commentary interspersed among the readings. 
As I have noted, Professor Stearns's commentary is extensive, and 
often includes lengthy discussions that are as substantive and nu-
anced as the readings that precede them. Professor Stearns gives a 
lengthy analysis of voting and the benefits of the simplified models 
used by economists after the first set of readings, 86 for instance, and 
offers an alternative economic explanation of judicial holdings in 
response to a pair of articles on stare decisis. 87 
Given that Public Choice and Public Law chronicles the 
emergence and flowering of public choice in the legal literature, many 
of the articles come from what I have described as the first wave of 
public-choice-influenced legal scholarship. But, Professor Stearns's 
commentary places the book firmly into the second wave. He is 
keenly aware of the need to perform a comparative institutional 
analysis, and this recurs throughout the commentary.88 The nature of 
his analysis is almost always institution-reinforcing. One after 
another, the commentaries suggest public choice explanations as to 
why our public institutions have developed as they have, and why 
that development makes sense. The economic explanation of judicial 
holdings that I just noted has this character, as does his account of 
the Supreme Court's Marks doctrine which I discuss below. One 
might even say that what Public Choice and Public Law is "about" is 
the versatility of the institution-reinforcing approach to public choice. 
The sense one gets in reading the commentaries together with 
the articles that prompt them, is that one is participating in Professor 
Stearns's own thinking process . The analogy that comes most 
immediately to mind is jazz. Traditional readers often either omit 
commentary entirely, or conclude each section with a series of brief, 
targeted questions based on the readings in the section. Much like a 
jazz performance, and in striking contrast, Professor Stearns's 
commentary picks up on particular themes and explores them at 
length, taking them in intriguing, and sometimes unexpected, 
directions. At times these flights seem unnecessarily digressive or 
fall flat. Professor Stearns's relatively lengthy discussion of the 
economic concept of an Edgeworth Box may well have been important 
John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045 (1996) (defending outcome voting on social 
choice grounds). 
86. Stearns, PCPL at 64-72 (cited in note 2). 
87. Id. at 546. 
88. See, for example, id. at 366-68 (comparing legislatures and courts). 
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to his own early thinking on these issues, for instance, but it seems 
unnecessary to a full understanding of the public choice literature.89 
More often, however, the commentary provides surprising, and 
genuinely new, insights. To give just one example, in his commentary 
on a pair of articles on legislative delegation, Professor Stearns moves 
from logrolling to a discussion of the Supreme Court's Marks90 doc-
trine. This doctrine holds that plurality decisions should be construed 
in accordance with the narrowest of the opinions that voted for the 
controlling outcome. Although the doctrine is surprising in some 
respects, 91 Professor Stearns speculates that it may accord with the 
Median Voter Theorem insight that majority voting pulls both 
extreme positions toward the middle. 92 He reasons that the Median 
Voter Theorem suggests that it is much more likely that all of the 
Justices in a fragmented majority would prefer the narrow opinion 
over the dissenting view than it is that they all would prefer a more 
sweeping holding. 93 Both the initial question-whether the Marks 
doctrine is the best approach to fractured decisions-and Stearns's 
use of social choice in an institution-reinforcing fashion to suggest a 
tentative answer are fascinating contributions. 
It is in these thoughtful, occasionally idiosyncratic explorations 
that Public Choice and Public Law makes a genuine contribution to 
the public choice literature. Professor Stearns suggests new perspec-
tives, and new questions, that will no doubt figure both in his own 
future work, and in the thinking of other scholars. At the same time, 
Professor Stearns does not neglect the traditional function of a reader. 
The articles are intelligently edited, and the selections are admirably 
representative of the public choice legal literature. On one or two 
occasions, I might have chosen different examples of an author's 
89. Id. at 362-66. The Edgeworth Box is a graph that depicts the points which maximize 
the utilities of two individuals with respect to fixed quantities of two different items. Although 
it seems unnecessary to Professor Stearns's discussion, which explores Pareto optimality and 
comparative institutional advantage, the discussion subsequently offers several intriguing 
speculations about the point of the Pareto criterion. 
90. Marks v. United States, 430 U .S. 188 (1977). 
91. To give the most obvious example, an opinion that received only one vote may control 
if it is the narrowest of the opinions that voted for the majority outcome. 
92. For a description of the Median Voter Theorem, see note 24. 
93. Stated differently, the Marks doctrine can be seen as assuming that there will be a 
consensus among the majority justices supporting the narrow view over the dissent. Stearns, 
PCPL at 126-29 (cited in note 2). Notice that this may not be the case if the justices' preferences 
prove to be multipeaked, since part of the majority in such a case might prefer the dissent over 
the narrow opinion. 
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work.94 But I was hard-pressed to think of any crucial articles that 
Professor Stearns omitted. In addition to including the most 
important work thus far, the book also provides a bibliography at the 
end of each subchapter, as well as extended appendices. Public 
Choice and Public Law is thus an extremely valuable reference for the 
first wave of public-choice-influenced legal scholarship, and a 
powerful demonstration of what may well be the next wave. 
94. Two examples come from a subchapter on legislative intent. First, I might have 
included Judge Frank Easterbrook's article, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The 
Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1984), rather than his article Statutes' 
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983), in Stearns, PCPL at 557 (cited in note 2), as it is 
arguably more important and more directly concerned with the implications of public choice for 
statutory interpretation. Second, I might have omitted Richard Posner's article, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 179 (1986-87), in Stearns, PCPL at 572 (cited in note 2), altogether, as it arguably 
does not make use of public choice insights at all. Yet in each case, Professor Stearns's choices 
are defensible. Judge Easterbrook's article contains extensive discussions of cases selected 
solely because they were decided in the 1983 term, for instance, and Judge Posner's article 
illustrates, as I discussed earlier, how dramatically his current view of statutory interpretation 
has changed from his earlier views. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 

